The Constitutional Right To Informational Privacy: NASA v. Nelson by Gorkin, Russell T.
DO NOT DELETE 11/30/2010 1:01:11 PM 
 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY: 
NASA V. NELSON 
RUSSELL T. GORKIN * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern substantive due process1 was borne in the landmark case 
Griswold v. Connecticut2 when the Supreme Court recognized that 
“specific guarantees” within the Bill of Rights protect various “zones 
of privacy.”3 Since then, the Court has guarded against interpretations 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
that merely reflect the “policy preferences of the Members of [the 
Supreme] Court”4 by limiting meaningful protection to those privacy 
interests so “deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition” that 
they are deemed “fundamental.”5 
NASA v. Nelson6 presents the Supreme Court with the 
opportunity to recognize another, more general privacy interest—the 
right to informational privacy.7 Due, however, to the evolving nature 
 
* 2012 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. This framework provides the foundation for the protection afforded to the “liberty” 
interest contained within the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
 2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 3. Id. at 484. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (grounding the protection of these 
privacy interests in the Due Process Clause). 
 4. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
 5. Id. at 721; of course, one may allege infringements of other liberty interests not deemed 
“fundamental rights,” but little real protection is afforded such interests since they are subject 
only to rational-basis review. See Francis S. Chlapowski, The Constitutional Protection of 
Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 144–45 (1991) (stating that the finding of whether a 
right is fundamental is often outcome-determinative because alleged infringements of rights 
subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis are almost always found to be impermissible, while alleged 
infringements of rights subjected to a rational basis review are almost always found to be 
justifiable). 
 6. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson I), 530 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 
(2010). 
 7. This term has come to represent the privacy interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters” first alluded to in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); see infra Section III (A). 
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of privacy,8 as well as the government’s longstanding practice of 
collecting “personal” information,9 a “history and tradition” analysis is 
unlikely to provide proof that such a right deserves constitutional 
protection. Thus, if the Court wishes to find the right to informational 
privacy constitutionally protected, it most likely will be forced to lend 
credence to the notion that the Due Process Clause protects not only 
fundamental rights deeply rooted in history and tradition, but also 
“unalienable rights” “endowed [in people] by their Creator.”10 
Whether the Court will choose to recognize such a right and 
significantly alter the approach it has taken to develop substantive 
due process doctrine, however, is far from certain. 
II. FACTS 
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is a federal research facility 
owned by the National Aeronautics Space Agency (NASA) and is 
operated by the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) pursuant 
to a contract.11 Since its inception, NASA, like all federal agencies, has 
conducted standard background investigations of its civil servant 
employees through the use of the National Agency Check with 
Inquiries (NACI) process.12 The NACI process first requires the 
applicant to complete and submit Standard Form 85 (SF-85), which 
requests “(1) background information, including residential, 
educational, employment, and military histories; (2) the names of 
three references . . . ; and (3) disclosure of any illegal drug use, 
possession, supply, or manufacture within the past year, along with . . . 
any treatment or counseling received.”13 Next, former employers, 
landlords and the three references identified by the applicant in SF-85 
are sent an “Investigative Request for Personal Information” (Form 
42) to verify the information provided in SF-85.14 Form 42 asks the 
 
 8. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (U.S. October 5, 
2010) [hereinafter Transcript] (Acting Solicitor General Katyal explained that “privacy is 
something that is in flux in ways that other things aren’t, both in terms of our social 
understandings, technology, and legislation itself.”). 
 9. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605 (“The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social 
security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the 
enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of 
information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if 
disclosed.”) 
 10. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 11. Nelson I, 530 F.3d at 870. 
 12. Id. at 871. 
 13. Id. at 870–71. 
 14. Id. at 871. 
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recipient to indicate whether they “have any adverse information 
about [the applicant’s] employment, residence, or activities 
concerning violations of law, financial integrity, abuse of alcohol 
and/or drugs, mental or emotional stability, general behavior or 
conduct, or other matters.”15 The recipient is also provided an 
opportunity to disclose any information already noted and to provide 
any additional information that she feels “may have a bearing on this 
person’s suitability for government employment.”16 Numerous 
safeguards exist (e.g., the Privacy Act) to prevent public dissemination 
of the information collected through the use of SF-85 and Form 42.17 
Finally, NASA and the Office for Personnel Management (OPM) 
review the information collected on these forms to determine 
suitability for access to NASA’s facilities.18 
In 2005, NASA revised its Security Program Procedural 
Requirements to require all employees, regardless of whether they 
were civil servants or contractors, to undergo the same NACI 
investigation.19 When NASA unilaterally modified its contract with 
Caltech in January of 2007, contract employees already working at 
Caltech became subject to these security clearance requirements.20 
Despite initially opposing the new requirements, Caltech 
subsequently adopted a policy that any JPL employee who did not 
successfully complete the NACI process would be deemed to have 
voluntarily resigned her Caltech employment.21 
A group of twenty-eight JPL scientists, engineers, and 
administrative personnel (“respondents” or “employees”), all 
classified as “low-risk” employees,22 filed suit in August 2007 alleging, 
 
 15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16. Id. at 874. 
 17. See Brief for Petitioners at 28–30, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (U.S. May 20, 2010). 
 18. Nelson I, 530 F.3d at 871. The Ninth Circuit appears to have based its decision, at least 
in part, on the fact that a document entitled “Issue Characterization Chart” might be used by 
NASA to determine “suitability”; the document lists “sodomy, carnal knowledge, abusive 
language, personality conflict, bad check, credit history, physical health issues, and mental, 
emotional, psychological or psychiatric issues” as potential criteria. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson 
II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008), denial for rehearing en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
1755 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties disagree over whether the “Issue 
Characterization Chart” will potentially be used by NASA to determine suitability, and whether 
this controversy is even properly before the Court. See infra Section V (B). 
 19. Nelson I, 530 F.3d at 871. 
 20. Id. at 871–72. Before these contract modifications, JPL employees had undergone 
background checks conducted by Caltech, but they had never been subjected to the NACI 
process. 
 21. Id. at 872. 
 22. Federal agencies classify positions as low, moderate, or high-risk, with the latter two 
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inter alia, that NASA’s newly imposed NACI background 
investigation requirement violates its members’ constitutional right to 
informational privacy.23 In September, the employees moved for a 
preliminary injunction to prevent Caltech from implementing its 
policy requiring that they submit SF-85 by early October as a 
condition for continued employment.24 The district court denied the 
employees’ request, finding that although the right to informational 
privacy was implicated, SF-85 was narrowly tailored to further the 
government’s legitimate security interests.25 A motions panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a temporary stay, 
finding that the “balance of hardships tips sharply in [employees’] 
favor” due to the consequences that would result from refusal to 
submit to the NACI process before an appeal on the merits could be 
heard.26 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “No person shall be . . . 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”27 The 
substantive aspects of this liberty interest initially were interpreted by 
the Lochner Court28 to protect an individual’s right to enter contracts 
without interference from the government, but this approach was 
later rejected.29 The Court’s holding in Griswold v. Connecticut30 
marked the birth of noneconomic substantive due process doctrine,31 
and Roe v. Wade32 cemented the basis for the privacy interests 
 
groups normally designated as “public trust” positions. 5 C.F.R. §731.106(a)(b) (2010). 
 23. Nelson I, 530 F.3d at 872. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson III), 506 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment contains a similar clause 
protecting these interests from State intrusion: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 28. Named after the landmark case Lochner v. New York, the Lochner Court refers to the 
era stretching from the late nineteenth century through the early-mid-twentieth century 
characterized by judicial activism aimed at striking down statutes that interfered with liberty to 
contract. See Chaplowski, supra note 5, at 136. 
 29. See Chaplowski, supra note 5, at 136–39 (discussing the rise and fall of the economic 
liberty interest protected by the Lochner Court). 
 30. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state law which prohibited 
the use and dissemination of information relating to contraceptives). 
 31. Chaplowski, supra note 5, at 139 n.38. 
 32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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recognized in Griswold in the Due Process Clause.33 Careful to avoid 
a return to Lochner-era judicial activism,34 “[t]he Supreme Court has 
since planted a set of ‘guideposts for responsible decisionmaking’ 
concerning limited fundamental rights ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition’ in an attempt ‘to rein in the subjective elements 
that are necessarily present in due-process judicial review.’”35 
According to the Court’s jurisprudence, these rights include “the 
rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and 
upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, 
to bodily integrity, and to abortion.”36 Yet, the Supreme Court 
“hinted” thirty-three years ago that the Due Process Clause might 
also protect the right to informational privacy but “has never said 
another word about it.”37 
A. The Hint(s): Whalen v. Roe (and Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services) 
In Whalen v. Roe,38 a group of doctors and patients alleged that a 
New York statute allowing the state to collect and store the name and 
address of any person receiving a specified class of drug prescription 
violated a constitutional right to informational privacy.39 In a 
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the statute was the 
“product of an orderly and rational legislative decision,” and that the 
means used were a “reasonable exercise of New York’s broad police 
powers.”40 The Court refused to strike down the statute merely 
because its requirements were not proven to be completely necessary 
 
 33. See id. at 153 (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of . . . liberty . . . as we feel it is . . . . ”) (referencing the Fourteenth 
Amendment and not the Fifth Amendment because the focus of the challenge was a state, and 
not a federal, law). 
 34. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“We must therefore ‘exercise 
the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field,’ lest the liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences 
of the Members of this Court.”) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). 
 35. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 2008), denial for 
rehearing en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (Callahan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Washington, 521 U.S. at 720–22). 
 36. Washington, 521 U.S. at 720 (internal citations omitted). 
 37. Nelson II, 568 F.3d at 1052 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that en banc review 
should have been granted because the current state of the law is muddled, not because the court 
of appeals necessarily misapplied circuit law). 
 38. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 39. See id. at 591. 
 40. Id. at 597–98. 
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to satisfy the state’s interests.41 
The Court continued its analysis by recognizing “at least two 
different kinds of [privacy] interests. One is the individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”42 The 
Court concluded that because the statute contained sufficient 
protections to prevent public dissemination of the information 
collected, the statute did not, “on its face, pose a sufficiently grievous 
threat to either [privacy] interest to establish a constitutional 
violation.”43 It is important to note the Court’s implicit suggestion that 
the mere collection of information by the government could result in 
informational privacy right violations, even if the government does 
not intend to publicly disseminate that information.44 
Finally, it is “strange” that the Court engaged in this privacy 
analysis at all45 considering that it concluded its opinion with a 
disclaimer stating that it had declined to decide whether the 
Constitution actually protects a right to informational privacy.46 
Apparently, the Court found the analysis warranted because such a 
right “arguably has its roots in the Constitution.”47 
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,48 decided during the 
same year, is the only other case in which the Supreme Court has 
addressed an informational privacy claim. There, former President 
Nixon challenged the constitutionality of the recently enacted 
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (the Act).49 
The Act stipulated that the Administrator of General Services take 
 
 41. Id. at 598. 
 42. Id. at 599–600. 
 43. Id. at 600. 
 44. Brief for Respondents at 36, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (U.S. August 2, 2010) 
(arguing that in Whalen, the Court stated that “[e]ven without public disclosure, it is, of course, 
true that private information must be disclosed to the authorized employees of the New York 
Department of Health . . . . Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State . . . does 
not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy.” 429 U.S. at 602 (emphasis 
added). This statement therefore implies that although requiring one to make a disclosure to the 
state may not be an automatic violation, violations may, given different circumstances, still be 
found). Id.  
 45. Transcript, supra note 8, at 8 (General Katyal: “It’s just like in Whalen, because in 
Whalen this Court assumed the existence of some sort of constitutional right and then said: Is 
that right violated here?” Justice Scalia: “It’s a strange way to proceed. We normally don’t do 
that, see? If there was a constitutional right, would it cover this?”). 
 46. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605–06. 
 47. Id. at 605 (emphasis added). 
 48. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 49. Id. at 429. 
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custody of all presidential papers and tape recordings for screening by 
Executive Branch archivists for the purpose of returning to the 
President any materials that were “personal and private in nature,” 
with the government retaining the remaining materials for historical 
preservation.50 The Court employed a balancing test to analyze 
Nixon’s claim, and found that it was without merit  
[in light] of the limited intrusion of the screening process, of [his] status as 
a public figure, of his lack of any expectation of privacy in the 
overwhelming majority of the materials, of the important public interest in 
preservation of the materials, and of the virtual impossibility of segregating 
the small quantity of private materials without comprehensive screening.51 
The very fact that the Court considered whether Nixon’s 
informational privacy rights had been violated, when public 
dissemination was not an issue, lends strong support to the notion that 
informational privacy concerns may be triggered by the mere 
collection of information.52 
However, the precedential value of Nixon is mitigated by the 
Court’s conflated analysis of the President’s Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment privacy-violation claims.53 Because the materials in 
which Nixon potentially had a legitimate expectation of privacy were 
comingled with those in which he did not, the Court found the 
screening process to be constitutionally permissible—it reflected the 
least intrusive means to collect information in which the government 
had a legitimate interest.54 Thus, the Court never independently 
addressed Nixon’s informational privacy claim (i.e., what information 
an individual can prohibit the government from collecting, and when, 
if at all, this prohibition can be overcome); instead it focused on his 
Fourth Amendment claim (i.e., whether the manner in which the 
government collected the information to which it was entitled was 
constitutionally permissible given any potential collateral 
consequences).55 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 465. 
 52. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 37. 
 53. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 455–66. The Court addressed Nixon’s First Amendment privacy 
challenge separately. See id. at 455 n.18. 
 54. Id. at 464. 
 55. See id. at 455–66. 
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B. Lower courts recognize a constitutional right to informational 
privacy 
Despite the ambiguous nature of the decisions in both Whalen and 
Nixon, most circuit courts have interpreted the holdings of these cases 
as establishing a constitutional right to informational privacy.56 In 
analyzing potential infringements, courts have relied on a balancing 
test that weighs “the government’s interest in having or using the 
information against the individual’s interest in denying access.”57 
Factors courts have considered in weighing these interests include: 
[T]he type of record requested, the information it does or might contain, 
the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the 
injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was 
generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, 
the degree of need for access, and whether there is an express statutory 
mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable interest militating 
toward access.58 
Other factors that may be relevant include whether the disclosure 
is voluntary or compelled, whether the disclosure implicates a 
fundamental right, whether the requested information has been kept 
private or has been disclosed to third parties, and whether the 
government is seeking and using the information in its role as 
sovereign or as employer.59 
American Federation of Government Employees v. HUD60 and 
National Treasury Employees Union v. U.S. Department of Treasury61 
 
 56. See Stathros v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 198 F.3d 317, 322–23 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (citing Whalen for proceeding with an analysis of whether financial disclosure 
requirements violated Stathros’ right to privacy); see also Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 
5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 1987); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 
(4th Cir. 1990); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132–33 (5th Cir. 1978); Denius v. Dunlap, 
209 F.3d 944, 955 (7th Cir. 2000); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F. 3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1996); Tuscon 
Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 
(10th Cir. 1986); Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985). But see 
Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 841–42 (1st Cir. 1987) (expressing concern regarding the 
existence of such a right, but declining to address the issue); Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 
442 (recognizing a privacy interest only when a fundamental right is implicated); Am. Fed’n of 
Gov’t Emps. v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (expressing “grave doubts” as to the 
existence of such a right, but proceeding to analyze and reject the claim anyway). 
 57. Doe v. Att’y Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 58. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 59. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1052–54 (9th Cir. 2008), denial for 
rehearing en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 60. Am. Fed’n, 118 F.3d. 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 61. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 25 F.3d 237 (5th 
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are the only two cases that involve privacy challenges by employees to 
requests for information on standardized government forms similar to 
those used in the NACI process.62 Neither court found the 
informational privacy challenges to have merit.63 Central to both 
courts’ reasoning were the measures put in place specifically to 
prevent the public dissemination of the information disclosed.64 
IV. HOLDING 
In Nelson v. NASA, the Ninth Circuit held that it was possible that 
the JPL employees could succeed on the merits of their informational 
privacy claim, and that the denial of a preliminary injunction against 
the NACI process would force the employees into the Hobson’s 
choice of suffering a potential infringement of their constitutional 
rights or, due to Caltech’s new policy, resigning from their jobs.65 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a 
preliminary injunction against the use of the NACI process.66 
Although the JPL employees conceded that many of the questions 
contained within SF-85 are “unproblematic,” they challenged the 
constitutionality of the following question: 
In the last year, have you used, possessed, supplied, or manufactured illegal 
drugs? . . . If you answered “Yes,” provide information relating to the types 




 62. The challenges in both cases pertained to questions on SF-85P (used for “public trust” 
officials), which is the slightly more intrusive equivalent to SF-85 (used for federal civil service 
and contract employees). See Nelson II, 568 F.3d at 1047–48 (Callahan, J., dissenting). Compare 
Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 
http://opm.gov/Forms/pdf_fill/sf85.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2010) (SF-85 requests information 
pertaining to drug use, etc. over the last year.) with Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions, 
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, http://opm.gov/Forms/pdf_fill/sf85p.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2010) (SF-85P requests information pertaining to drug use, etc. over the past five 
years.). 
 63. Am. Fed’n, 118 F.3d at 795; NTEU, 25 F.3d at 244. 
 64. See Am. Fed’n, 118 F.3d at 793–94; NTEU, 25 F.3d at 244. Additionally, the court in 
NTEU perhaps based its holding in greater part on the fact that the employees held positions of 
“public trust,” and therefore were found to have reduced expectations of privacy. See NTEU, 25 
F.3d at 243–44. The employees in Am. Fed’n were also “public trust” employees, but the court 
only mentioned this fact in passing. See Am. Fed’n, 118 F.3d at 794. 
 65. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson I), 530 F.3d 865, 883 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
1755 (2010) The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the JPL employees were 
unlikely to succeed on their Administrative Procedure Act and Fourth Amendment claims. Id. 
at 877. 
 66. Id. at 878. 
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your involvement with illegal drugs. Include any treatment or counseling 
received.67 
The Ninth Circuit held that while the employees’ informational 
privacy rights potentially are implicated by the question requiring the 
disclosure of any “use, possession, supply, and manufacture” of drugs, 
the question is narrowly tailored to a legitimate government interest.68 
The Ninth Circuit explained that “the federal government has taken a 
strong stance in its war on illegal drugs, and this stance would be 
significantly undermined if its own employees and contractors freely 
ignored its laws.”69 The Ninth Circuit also held, however, that 
requiring the disclosure of “any treatment or counseling received” 
likely infringes the employees’ informational privacy rights.70 The 
Ninth Circuit provided two reasons for its holding. First, it held that 
“[i]nformation relating to medical treatment and psychological 
counseling fall squarely within the domain protected by the 
constitutional right to informational privacy.”71 Second, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that such treatment or counseling “would 
presumably lessen the government’s concerns regarding the 
underlying activity,” and therefore the government had failed to 
demonstrate any legitimate state interest to “compel,” rather than 
make voluntary, such disclosures.72 Thus, in reversing the lower court 
the Ninth Circuit held that constitutional questions remained 
regarding this albeit narrow portion of the challenged question. 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that since SF-85 contains a 
waiver authorizing the government to distribute Form 42, the district 
court erred by also failing to address the employees’ informational 
privacy claim with respect to Form 42.73 The Ninth Circuit held that 
the open-ended inquiries within Form 42 are “much more 
problematic” than SF-85. Although the government has legitimate 
interests in ensuring JPL employees “are who they say they are” and 
in securing the facility, the questions on Form 42 are too broad to be 
considered “narrowly tailored” to achieving these interests.74 Finally, 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the authorization waiver contained 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 879. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 873–74. 
 74. Id. at 879–80. 
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within SF-85, which allows the government “to obtain any 
information from any source, subject to other releases being necessary 
only in some vague and unspecified contexts,” lacked sufficient 
standards to support a finding that such inquiries are, in fact, narrowly 
tailored.75 
V. ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. The Government (Petitioners) 
Perhaps because of the muddled framework for analyzing 
informational privacy claims,76 the government first makes two 
general arguments militating against a finding of a violation of the 
employees’ privacy rights before couching its argument within the 
Ninth Circuit’s “legitimate interest/narrowly tailored” standard. 
First, the government points out that it “often must collect 
personal information to fulfill basic government functions,”77 and that 
“constitutional privacy concerns are generally satisfied by safeguards 
against [the] unauthorized” public dissemination of the information 
collected.78 The government argues that the numerous protections in 
place to prevent public dissemination, including the Privacy Act,79 
significantly reduce the strength of the employees’ claim.80 
Second, the government argues that the employees’ claim must be 
analyzed in light of the fact that the government is collecting the 
information in its role as employer, rather than as enforcer of the 
laws.81 The Supreme Court has recognized that “the government could 
not function effectively if ‘every employment decision became a 
constitutional matter’,”82 and that “the employee’s expectation of 
privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment relation.”83 
The government concludes by arguing that conducting employment-
related background checks is a reasonable and accepted practice in 
 
 75. Id. at 881. 
 76. See supra Section III. 
 77. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 24–25; see supra note 9. 
 78. Id. at 17–18. 
 79. Id. at 27–29 (explaining the protections afforded by the Privacy Act). 
 80. Id.at 27–30 (detailing the various protections against public dissemination in the 
present case). 
 81. Id. at 41–42. 
 82. Id. at 33 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)). 
 83. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
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our society.84 
The government attacks both lines of the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning that led it to conclude that SF-85 violates the employees’ 
informational privacy rights. First, the government argues that the 
information it seeks pertains not to a fundamental right but to recent 
drug use, and that drug laws “put citizens on notice that this realm is 
not a private one.”85 Thus, the government concludes that the 
contested question “does not raise the same constitutional concerns 
as questions having no relationship to unlawful activity or questions 
intruding into” fundamental rights.86 Second, as an employer, the 
government has a “legitimate interest” in knowing the extent to which 
any employee is involved with illegal drugs, and the “treatment and 
counseling” question, which is only used for the employee’s benefit,87 
aids the government in its assessment of whether the employee is 
suitable for employment.88 
The government also attacks the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the 
open-ended inquiries contained within Form 42 likely infringe 
employees’ informational privacy rights, primarily on three grounds. 
First, the government argues that Form 42 “is neither designed nor 
used for unanchored inquiries into an individual’s personal affairs” 
because the information requested is solicited expressly for the 
purpose of determining suitability for government employment, and 
the Privacy Act limits the collection of information by NASA to that 
which is “relevant and necessary” to accomplish its purpose.89 Second, 
the government argues that the mere fact that the inquiries made on 
Form 42 are open-ended does not by itself raise constitutional 
concerns,90 especially when the government is acting in a manner 
consistent with “what any sensible private employer would do.”91 
Finally, relying primarily on Fourth Amendment precedent,92 the 
government argues that information solicited from third-parties does 
 
 84. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 35–38. 
 85. Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 86. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 41. 
 87. Transcript, supra note 8, at 16. 
 88. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 42–44; 
 89. Id. at 45. 
 90. Id. at 45–46. 
 91. Id. at 46 (quoting Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008), 
denial for rehearing en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that open-ended questions are commonplace and necessary in the employment 
context)). 
 92. See id. at 53. 
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not usually warrant constitutional protection “because once the 
individual voluntarily discloses information to another, she 
necessarily assumes the risk that the other person will disclose the 
information to the government.”93 
B. JPL Employees (Respondents) 
The employees’ strongest arguments are grounded in the Ninth 
Circuit’s grant of a preliminary injunction. Unfortunately for the 
employees, their substantive arguments are unconvincing or easily 
rebutted, and the technicalities and interlocutory status of this 
litigation on which they rely are unlikely to be availing given the 
practical consequences of the Ninth Circuit’s holding.94 
Regarding SF-85, the employees first argue that the question 
pertaining to “treatment or counseling” for drug use implicates 
employees’ constitutional right to informational privacy because it 
“relates to intimate health information”95 and because “discovery . . . 
carries a risk of lost job opportunities, in addition to stigmatization 
and embarrassment.”96 This argument, however, ignores the question’s 
nature as a follow-up inquiry posed to an employee who has already 
admitted to recent drug use.97 Thus, the “health information” sought is 
not a “freestanding inquiry about treatment or counseling,” but is 
limited to a subject about which the Ninth Circuit already found 
constitutionally permissible to ask about.98 Further, responding to the 
“treatment or counseling” question does not pose any material 
additional risk to lost job opportunities, stigmatization, or 
embarrassment considering the employee has “already reported both 
the fact and nature of [his] illegal drug use.”99 
The employees then argue that because their informational 
privacy rights have been implicated, under the Ninth Circuit’s 
intermediate-scrutiny standard, the government must show a 
“legitimate interest” for intruding on these rights.100 The employees 
claim that the government failed to assert any such legitimate interest 
 
 93. Id. at 53. 
 94. See infra Section VI (A). 
 95. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 20. 
 96. Id. at 22. 
 97. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16–17, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (Sept. 1, 2010). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 17. 
 100. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 25. 
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in the lower courts,101 and therefore the Ninth Circuit correctly 
concluded that there are serious questions regarding the merits of the 
employees’ informational privacy claim.102 Despite the employees’ 
assertion that this argument is dispositive, they respond to the 
primary-legitimate interest that the government now asserts:103 “[i]f 
the government wishes to give the benefit of the doubt to applicants 
who have sought treatment or counseling for illegal drug abuse, it 
could easily do so by allowing them to voluntarily provide such 
information.”104 As the Court noted in Whalen,105 however, courts 
should avoid “policing” forms in a “Lochnerian” manner and finding 
them unconstitutional merely because the way in which a question is 
worded may be unnecessary to achieve a legitimate purpose.106 
The employees also argue that the Ninth Circuit correctly 
concluded that Form 42 raises serious questions as to the merits of 
their informational privacy claim because the potential use of the 
“Issue Characterization Chart”107 by NASA to determine suitability 
for employment indicates that information relating to employees’ 
private sexual matters may be the target of its inquiries.108 The 
employees then point out that the government has failed to offer a 
legitimate interest to justify “delving” into such matters.109 This 
argument is unconvincing for three reasons.  
First, the lower courts have already found that any claim relating 
to how NASA would determine suitability for access to NASA’s 
facilities was “unripe and unfit for judicial review.”110 Second, the 
employees challenge Form 42 on its face, as “[b]y its [very] terms, [it] 
seeks only information that has a bearing on the applicant’s suitability 
 
 101. Id. Contra Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 97, at 18. 
 102. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 25. 
 103. The government’s legitimate interest is in providing a benefit to the employee after the 
government determines whether his drug use affects his suitability for employment or access. 
Transcript, supra note 8, at 16. 
 104. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 26. 
 105. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977). 
 106. Transcript, supra note 8, at 18. 
 107. See Nelson v. NASA (Nelson I), 530 F.3d 865, 871 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 
S. Ct. 1755 (2010); see also supra note 18. 
 108. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 44, at 33–35. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Nelson I, 530 F.3d at 873; see ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92 (3d. 
ed. 2009) (“[R]ipeness doctrine seeks to separate matters that are premature for review because 
the injury is speculative and never may occur, from those cases that are appropriate for federal 
court action.”). 
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for government employment or a security clearance.”111 Finally, the 
government has asserted that it will not use the “chart” to make 
suitability determinations.112 The employees argue that these 
assertions should be disregarded because “supplementing the record 
at the appellate level is an extraordinary step.”113 However, such 
assertions surely will be relevant during any proceedings for a 
permanent injunction, which would likely follow if the Supreme Court 
affirmed and would further the interests of justice and judicial 
economy.114 Finally, as the government noted during oral arguments, 
an as-applied challenge would be more appropriate to confront any 
situation in which the government asks for or uses information 
generally deemed inappropriate for determining suitability for 
employment and/or access to JPL’s facilities.115 
Finally, the employees make numerous arguments that refute 
those proffered by the government, but all are unconvincing. First, the 
employees argue that the protections against the public dissemination 
of the information collected, including the Privacy Act, are 
insufficient.116 However, the Privacy Act has protected the personal 
information collected through the NACI process for more than three 
decades, and there is no evidence that it has ever been publicly 
disseminated. Moreover, it would be an extreme measure to facially 
invalidate “widely-used background-check forms” merely because the 
public dissemination of information collected is remotely possible.117 
Second, the employees point out that although the government 
argues that it has greater discretion when acting as an employer, JPL 
employees are not government employees—they are contractors 
employed by Caltech.118 Further, “[b]y unilaterally imposing the new 
requirements upon Caltech . . . the government is using special powers 
that are available to it only in its sovereign capacity.”119 As the 
 
 111. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 97, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 55; Transcript, supra note 8, at 21–22. 
 113. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 32 (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 
494 U.S. 472, 482 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 114. In fact, during oral argument both Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg explicitly asked 
about the role the Issue Characterization Chart plays in determinations for suitability, and 
appeared satisfied with the government’s representation that the chart has not, and will not, be 
used to determine suitability. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 21–22. 
 115. Id. at 25. 
 116. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 43–46. 
 117. Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601–02 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 118. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 46. 
 119. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008), denial for rehearing 
en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (Wardlaw, J., concurring). 
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government notes, however, “[the Supreme] Court has never 
restricted the deference due to the government in the employment 
context to actions affecting civil servants.”120 Instead it has held that  
 
“[d]eference is . . . due to the government’s reasonable assessments of 
its interests as contractor.”121 
Finally, the employees counter the government’s argument that 
the information collected through the use of Form 42 is not subject to 
privacy protections because it has been collected from third parties. 
They argue “[t]he Fourth Amendment is concerned with how the 
government obtains information, while the right to informational 
privacy is concerned with what information the government obtains, 
regardless of how or from whom the information is obtained.”122 Here, 
both the employees and the government have a solid basis for their 
positions because lower court judges have disagreed over this very 
point.123 
VI. DISPOSITION 
When deciding this case it is unclear whether the Supreme Court 
will employ a traditional substantive due process framework or 
depart from this established doctrine. Regardless of the approach the 
Court takes, several signals and practical considerations indicate that 
it is almost certain to rule in the government’s favor. 
A. The Outcome 
At first glance, it might seem that the Supreme Court granted the 
petition for writ of certiorari because the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
appears to create a circuit split with both the Fifth and D.C. Circuits.124 
 
 120. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 97, at 8–9. 
 121. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996). 
 122. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 54. 
 123. Compare Nelson v. NASA (Nelson I), 530 F.3d 880 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 
130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (noting that although in the Fourth Amendment context there is a general 
principle “that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily 
turns over to third parties . . . the legitimate expectation of privacy described in this context is a 
term of art used only to define a search under the Fourth Amendment”) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted) with Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) v. U.S. Dept. of 
Treasury, 25 F.3d 237, 243 n.3 (noting that “[t]he constitutional right of [informational] privacy . 
. . like the right of privacy protected directly by the Fourth Amendment, is defined by (and 
extends only to) a person’s ‘reasonable expectations’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 124. See supra Section III (B). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/30/2010  1:01:11 PM 
2010] THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 17 
This conclusion is flawed for two reasons. First, it is disputable 
whether a circuit split exists, since the basis for the decisions in both 
circuits was arguably the fact that the employees in those cases had a 
reduced expectation of privacy due to their status as “public trust” 
employees. The employees involved in this litigation are “low-risk” 
independent contractors.125 Second, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is 
merely an interlocutory decision that “made no legal conclusions or 
factual findings that are binding in further proceedings on the 
merits.”126 It is possible that upon review of a full factual record the 
Ninth Circuit would reach a decision in accord with the D.C. and Fifth 
Circuits’ holdings. 
Moreover, the interlocutory nature of the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
is critical to predicting the outcome of this case. The Supreme Court 
has stated that it “generally await[s] final judgment in the lower 
courts before exercising . . . certiorari jurisdiction,”127 and only reviews 
decisions granting preliminary injunctions in situations where the 
grant was “clearly erroneous.”128 Thus, the grant of the petition for 
certiorari itself provides strong support for the notion that the Court 
will rule in favor of the government. 
Two practical considerations might have led the Supreme Court to 
intervene at this early stage and both weigh heavily in the 
government’s favor. First, the government has conducted background 
checks for government employees for over fifty years.129 Each year SF-
85 is used more than 100,000 times,130 and Form 42 is sent to over 
1,000,000 recipients.131 These forms are an integral part of the way the 
government does business. The Supreme Court likely did not want to 
risk the possibility of a permanent injunction that would significantly 
disrupt government activities until the Supreme Court could consider 
 
 125. Compare Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2008), denial 
for rehearing en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (discussing key factual differences 
between the case at bar and NTEU and Am. Fed’n leading to divergent outcomes) with Nelson 
II, 568 F.3d at 1047 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (noting that the panel’s opinion “diverges from the 
reasoning of the D.C. and Fifth Circuits”); see also Am. Fed’n, NTEU supra note 64 (briefly 
explaining the relevant factual difference between the case at bar, and NTEU and Am. Fed’n, 
that perhaps accounts for the divergent outcomes). 
 126. Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 12, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (Feb. 3, 2010). 
 127. VA Military Inst. v. United States, 508 U.S. 946, 946 (1993) (explaining the decision to 
deny the petition for writ of certiorari). 
 128. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 975 (1997) (per curiam). 
 129. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 3. 
 130. Id. at 42. 
 131. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008), denial for rehearing 
en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/30/2010  1:01:11 PM 
18 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 6:1 
the matter itself.132 Reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s decision at this 
interlocutory stage appears to be the more prudent course of action. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s decision sets no minimum standard for 
alleging an infringement of one’s informational privacy rights. Thus, 
under the Ninth Circuit’s decision, “any time the government collects 
information an individual would prefer to keep private, it implicates a 
constitutional privacy right that requires the government to satisfy an 
ad hoc balancing test.”133 By not defining when privacy interests may 
be constitutionally protected (e.g., when there is a sufficient threat of 
public dissemination, or when a fundamental right is implicated), the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision puts an enormous burden on the 
government’s ability to operate.134 The Court is likely concerned that 
this ruling will result in a flood of frivolous lawsuits, wasting 
significant government time and resources.135 By granting certiorari at 
this stage, the Court can set a standard that limits the potential for 
frivolous suits. 
B. The Reasoning: Three Approaches 
There are three approaches the Supreme Court could take to 
justify a ruling in favor of the government: (1) declare that there is no 
constitutional right to informational privacy; (2) declare that there 
might be a constitutional right to informational privacy, but hold that 
even if there is such a right, it is not violated here; or (3) declare that 
there is in fact a constitutional right to informational privacy, define 
the scope and contours of the right, and apply those standards to the 
facts presented. The Supreme Court most likely will take the second 
approach for two reasons.  
First, compared to the first approach, the second approach more 
faithfully respects prior Supreme Court precedent.136 Second, taking 
the third approach will most likely require the Court to broaden the 
protection the Due Process Clause currently affords (i.e., by holding 
that the Clause protects not only those rights deeply rooted in history 
 
 132. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 7 (Justice Roberts confirmed that if the Court sustained 
the preliminary injunction the government would be enjoined from using SF-85 and Form 42 as 
they are currently written throughout the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction. Presumably the Court 
would rather find the forms unconstitutional, and invalidate them nationwide, or constitutional, 
and allow the government to continue operating under the status quo.). 
 133. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 97, at 1. 
 134. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 54–55. 
 135. See id. at 34. 
 136. See supra Section III (A). 
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and tradition, but also certain “unalienable” rights).137 Such a holding 
likely would result in an onslaught of new challenges to various 
government practices and laws allegedly violating a host of claimed 
“unalienable” rights. The Supreme Court might prefer not to broaden 
the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause and/or to avoid 
the difficult task of establishing a framework to decide which rights 
are, in fact, “unalienable.” Thus, the second approach allows the 
Supreme Court to decide the matter at hand while keeping the door 
open to the alterations to substantive due process analysis inherent in 
the third approach, which might be more properly implemented upon 
a different set of facts when no other viable adjudicative approaches 
are available. 
1. There is no constitutional right to informational privacy. 
Although there likely will be some support for declaring that the 
Constitution does not protect any right to informational privacy,138 it is 
unlikely that a majority (or even a plurality) of the Court will support 
this view given its holdings in Whalen and Nixon,139 and the 
recognition of such a right by the vast majority of circuits.140 
2. There might be a right, but it is not violated here. 
Creating bright-line rules for novel and unforeseeable factual 
situations is especially challenging in this context given the 
continuously evolving nature of the concept of privacy itself.141 Thus, 
the Court may find it tempting to rely on Whalen, and decline to 
address whether a constitutional right to informational privacy 
actually exists.142 However, this approach will not prevent the Court 
from holding that such a right is not violated here. This is the 
 
 137. See supra Section I. 
 138. See id. at 14–15 (in which Justice Scalia noted that he cannot find where in the 
Constitution it protects such a right, and the legislature is the appropriate branch of government 
to address such issues). Further, it is interesting to note that Justice Stewart expressed a similar 
view in Whalen. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607–08 (1977) (“[t]here is no general 
constitutional right to privacy . . . . [T]he protection of a person’s general right to privacy—his 
right to be let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, 
left largely to the law of the individual States.”) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389, U.S. 347, 
350–51 (1967)); Nixon v. Admin’r of Gen. Serv., 429 U.S. 589, 455 n.18 (1977) (noting that 
Justice Stewart still adhered to the views he expressed in Whalen). 
 139. See supra Section III (A). 
 140. See supra Section III (B). 
 141. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 9 (Acting Solicitor General Katyal explained that 
“privacy is something that is in flux in ways that other things aren’t, both in terms of our social 
understandings, technology, and legislation itself.”). 
 142. See supra Section III (A). 
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approach the government urges the Court to take.143 Thus, the Court 
could hold that the employees’ rights were not violated in light of the 
“reduced expectations of privacy in the employment context, the 
longstanding and widespread use of SF-85 and Form 42, and the 
Privacy Act’s protections regarding the maintenance and 
dissemination of the information,”144 regardless of whether the 
Constitution protects a right to informational privacy. 
3. The Constitution protects an individual’s right to informational 
privacy. 
Of course, it is also possible that the Supreme Court will take on 
the Herculean task of defining a right to informational privacy. To 
provide meaningful guideposts for the future, the Court should 
address the following questions: (1) Is there a threshold requirement 
that must be satisfied before the infringement of such a right may be 
challenged? (E.g., Is an “individual interest in avoiding [the] 
disclosure of personal matters” enough to bring a claim for 
infringement, or must a “fundamental right” or the public 
dissemination of the information be implicated?); (2) What is the 
appropriate level of scrutiny when analyzing a potential 
infringement? (E.g., Intermediate scrutiny or rational-basis review?); 
(3) Does the level of scrutiny vary based on other considerations? 
(E.g., Whether the government is acting as an employer or as enforcer 
of the laws?); (4) Is a right to informational privacy implicated when 
the information is sought from third parties? If the Supreme Court 
chooses to answer these difficult questions, it will recognize for the 
first time that the Constitution protects “unalienable rights” in 
addition to those “deeply rooted” in “history and tradition,” and will 
have charted a new course for substantive due process analysis. Such a 
holding seems unlikely because this case could be adjudicated without 
making such sweeping changes. . 
 
 
 143. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (Nov. 2, 2009) 
(“There is no need in this case to determine the scope of a constitutionally-based right to 
privacy for certain information or the range of governmental actions that may impermissibly 
interfere with such a right.”). 
 144. Id. 
